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1. Introduction 
We live in a world in which a few are blessed with power and wealth and many 
others are crippled by poverty and powerlessness. This state of affairs is, without 
doubt, morally objectionable and in need of urgent remedy. Entrenched power 
asymmetries and global market forces, however, give the privileged both a vested 
interest in keeping things as they are and the ability to resist change. What is more, 
even when there is a will to initiate change, the road to eradicating poverty and 
institutional failures is paved with traps and vicious circles. Effective remedies must, 
therefore, be sensitive to real-world political and economic constraints. 
A remedy seemingly satisfying this condition, which has gained popularity 
among political leaders and the wider public alike, is “microfinance.” Offering 
financial services (particularly loans) to those who are too poor to access the 
traditional banking system looks like an excellent strategy for responding to world 
poverty in a way that is both empowering for the poor and economically efficient. 
Microfinance, that is, appears to promote development by exploiting, rather than 
countering, existing market mechanisms. 
According to critics, however, microfinance institutions (MFIs) also have a 
“dark side:” they are ineffective at best, and exploitative at worst (Hulme 2000). 
Their purported ineffectiveness stems from their inability to reach the poorest of the 
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poor. Their alleged exploitative nature lies in MFIs often charging very high interest 
rates in order to be economically self-sustaining. Problematically, though, avoiding 
high interests turns microloans into quasi-donations, thus undercutting MFIs’ 
capacity to take advantage of market mechanisms. Do these criticisms have merit? If 
so, should we conclude that microfinance is ill-suited to addressing the plight of the 
disadvantaged? 
In this chapter, we argue that while these criticisms have bite when directed 
at existing MFIs, they do not suffice to disprove the potential of microfinance as a 
means of fighting global injustice. We agree with critics that some aspects of MFIs 
are problematic from a moral and/or financial point of view. We also agree that 
microfinance is an unlikely remedy for severe, life-threatening poverty, and 
therefore an inadequate vehicle for fulfilling the most immediate demands of 
humanity and global distributive injustice. However, we suggest that microfinance 
services, suitably restructured, may assist in tackling another, somewhat under-
emphasized, dimension of global injustice: the structural and political 
disempowerment of the world’s poor. In short, we argue that MFIs might contribute 
to mitigating what we call political injustice. 
Global disempowerment is, of course, connected to world poverty: poverty 
often breeds disempowerment, and disempowerment often breeds poverty. In order 
to tackle poor citizens’ disempowerment with respect to both their own domestic 
institutions and global actors, arguably structural changes of the current global order 
need to occur. However, since such large-scale structural changes take time and their 
prospects of success are mixed, we suggest that intelligently planned microfinance 
projects might both offer a promising “second-best” solution and perhaps even help 
fuelling structural reform on a larger scale in the meantime.  
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If microfinance projects are well designed, and if sufficient resources are 
regularly and reliably channelled towards them, they might contribute to the 
formation of a mid-level, economically active social group in developing 
countries—a group with a vested interest in making political institutions more 
“inclusive” and accountable, and with some power to do so.1 This, of course, 
requires significant changes to existing MFIs. The conclusion we reach is therefore 
tentative: Our claim is that the shortfalls of existing MFIs do not constitute a 
devastating blow to microfinance in principle. The potential of microfinance 
deserves to be explored further—particularly in connection with democratization, 
large-scale empowerment, and political justice. Whether existing shortfalls can be 
realistically overcome is, of course, a largely empirical matter that we cannot settle 
in the present paper.  
 Our argument is structured as follows. In Section 2, we offer a very brief 
overview of the history and workings of microfinance. In Section 3, we present three 
different perspectives from which the predicament of the poor can be addressed: 
humanity, distributive justice, and political justice. In Section 4, we consider 
whether microfinance represents a good response to humanitarian and distributive-
justice concerns and answer in the negative. In Section 5, we turn to microfinance in 
relation to political injustice and argue—with caution and caveats—that, suitably 
reformed, it may constitute a helpful instrument to tackle disempowerment under our 
current, highly non-ideal circumstances. After considering, and responding to, a 
number of objections in Section 6, we conclude that if we wish to tackle political 
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injustice, we may have good reason to explore the potential of microfinance further, 
whilst remaining aware of the limitations of existing MFIs. 
 
2. What Is Microfinance? 
The very poor have traditionally been excluded from conventional banking, due to 
their inability to provide sufficient guarantees in return for loans. MFIs aim to 
remedy this exclusion, and extend access to banking services—especially credit, but 
also savings and insurance—to the socio-economically disadvantaged. 
Behind the development of microfinance, as already noted by other 
contributors in this volume, lies the vision of Muhammad Yunus, an economist from 
Chittagong University, in Bangladesh. In 1983, Yunus officially established 
Grameen Bank, with the aim of providing loans to poor Bangladeshi men and 
women, thereby freeing them from dependence on, and exploitation by, local 
moneylenders. Yunus was convinced that, through microfinance, “millions of small 
people with their millions of small pursuits can add up to create the biggest 
development wonder” (Grameen Communications 1998). In 2006, Grameen Bank 
and Yunus jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize, “for their efforts to create 
economic and social development from below” (Nobel Media AB 2014). As of 
2011, the bank has provided credit to over eight million people in Bangladesh, 
especially women (Grameen Communications 1998; see also Perkins 2008).  
Since the establishment of Grameen Bank, many other microfinance— 
especially microcredit—institutions have emerged around the world, including in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and Canada (Morduch 1999, 1569). Although 
generalizations are always tricky, there are a number of features that often 
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characterize MFIs, and set them apart from more traditional financial service 
providers. 
Subsidy-dependency: Many—though not all—MFIs rely on subsidies in 
order to cover their operational costs and to keep their interest rates on loans 
sufficiently low. Although in recent years there has been a strong push towards self-
sustainability, a good number of MFIs still need to count on donor subsidies for their 
continued existence (Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters 2011).  
Integration of financial services and broader social services: Unlike 
traditional banks, some MFIs—often attached to NGOs—are not solely devoted to 
the provision of financial services, but integrate such provision with broader “social 
intermediation services such as group formation, development of self-confidence, 
and training in financial literacy and management capabilities” (Ledgerwood 1998, 
1). 
Lending without collateral: Microlending institutions typically do not ask for 
collateral in case of defaults on repayments. Collateral would in fact prevent many 
of their target clients, who typically have very few if any possessions, from being 
eligible for credit in the first place. Instead of insuring themselves against defaults 
on repayments, MFIs often try to maximize repayment rates, for example, by 
initiating repayment soon after loans have been granted, or by relying on special 
lending mechanisms such as group loans. These loans are given out to groups rather 
than single individuals, with the effect that members pressure each other into 
keeping to the envisaged repayment schedule (Ledgerwood 1998, 70; see also 
Morduch 1999).2 
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 MFIs are thus sui generis financial service providers, whose structure and 
modus operandi make them fit for extending access to credit (as well as savings and 
insurance) to low-income households which have typically been excluded from 
access to banking services. MFIs might look like the “silver bullet that will cure 
world poverty and spread the wealth-creating force of capitalism across the globe” 
(Perkins 2008). But is such optimism warranted? Can MFIs really remedy some of 
the most morally objectionable aspects of the world in which we live?  
 
3. Three Perspectives on the Moral Failures of Today’s World 
As we mentioned at the outset, our world is marked by poverty, inequality, and 
disempowerment for a large portion of its population. The perspectives from which 
we might address this ethically troublesome state of affairs are multiple. In what 




Consider, first, the perspective of humanity. Morally decent persons cannot remain 
indifferent to the suffering of fellow humans. Whenever others are in need, and we 
can assist them at little cost to ourselves, we have a moral duty to do so. From this 
perspective, it is wrong to hold on to resources that for us are superfluous, when we 
can use them to alleviate others’ misery. Humanity places a duty on us to help needy 
strangers using what we rightfully possess (we here follow B. Barry 1991; see also 
Valentini 2013).  
 To see the force of this duty, it is worth recalling its perhaps most eloquent 
defence, offered by Peter Singer over 30 years ago. Singer invites us to imagine 
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finding ourselves in the proximity of a shallow pond where a child is drowning. 
Saving the child would cost us very little: a few minutes and the bother of getting 
our clothes wet. Even though we are rightfully entitled to both our time and our “dry 
clothes,” it would be morally unacceptable to refuse to pull the child out of the 
water. The urgency of the child’s predicament, coupled with the relative ease with 
which we could perform the rescue, obligates us to use our time and resources to 
save him (Singer 1972; cf. Fabre 2002).3 
By analogy, if we can save many people’s lives simply by writing a cheque 
to Oxfam, or donating to other charities and NGOs, we are under a moral duty to do 
so (Singer 1999). Even if the resources we would devote to these projects are our 
own, we cannot keep hold of them and retain a clear conscience. Doing so would 
constitute a breach of humanity.  
 
3.2 Distributive Justice 
Humanitarian duties require that we help the needy using our own resources. But 
what if we are not entitled to the resources in our possession, and these rightfully 
belong to the needy? To answer this question, we must turn to the perspective of 
distributive justice—namely the branch of political morality that concerns the 
distribution of entitlements across agents.  
Predictably, there is a multiplicity of competing accounts of distributive 
justice. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on two in particular, which arguably lie 
at the opposite ends of the distributive-justice spectrum. One targets relative 
deprivation, and holds that nobody should be worse off through no fault of their own 
                                                
3 Though Singer, as a utilitarian, is unlikely to place as much emphasis on the distinction between 
duties of humanity and duties of justice (the latter giving rise to entitlements).  
	 8	
(responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism). The other targets absolute deprivation, and 
holds that every human being is entitled to enough resources to lead a decent life 
(sufficientarianism).4  
No matter which end of the “distributive-justice” spectrum we consider—
whether egalitarian or sufficientarian—the distribution of resources in the world 
today must be condemned as seriously unjust. While some (especially in the West) 
have access to plenty of resources, others are virtually doomed to a life of misery; 
and this through no fault of their own. Relative and absolute deprivation are both 
widespread in the world today.  
From the standpoint of distributive justice, we therefore ought to restructure 
the global pattern of holdings—either in order to equalize life prospects between the 
wealthy and the needy, or in order to give the latter a sufficient bundle of resources 
to lead decent lives. If we take the perspective of distributive justice seriously, we 
must conclude that we are not entitled to all of the resources in our possession; some 
of them belong to the world’s poor (B. Barry 1991). Our duties towards them are not 
a “mere” matter of humanity, but first and foremost an imperative of distributive 
justice (Pogge 2008; Valentini 2011). 
 
3.3 Political Justice5 
Finally, let us consider the perspective of political justice. Compared to distributive 
justice, political justice operates at a deeper level, focusing on the power structures 
that determine what people’s entitlements are. A social system is politically just only 
if power relations within it are not excessively asymmetrical, if nobody is subject to 
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(2009) and Blake (2001).  
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the arbitrary will of a few powerful actors.6 For instance, while a society with a 
perfectly just distribution of resources governed by a benevolent dictator would be 
unobjectionable from the standpoint of distributive justice, it would be problematic 
from that of political justice. Why? Because, in such a society, the citizenry would 
be entirely dependent on the will of a powerful individual. 
 If we take political justice seriously, what is morally problematic about the 
global order is that it breeds disempowerment and structural dependence, either 
directly or by contributing to domestic political injustice (Ronzoni 2012). An 
example of the former is arguably offered by WTO negotiations, where—at least 
until recently—wealthy nations could take advantage of their superior bargaining 
power and secure unfairly advantageous terms of trade vis-à-vis developing 
countries (see, e.g., Stiglitz 2006; Moellendorf 2005; Steinberg 2002; Grewal 2008, 
95). Other forms of direct political injustice involve the IMF and the World Bank. 
As Ngaire Woods and others argue, these institutions intrude in the recipients’ most 
important policy decisions by placing strict conditions on the aid they offer (Woods 
and Narlikar 2001). What is more, their criteria of conditionality are often aimed at 
promoting policies that please powerful shareholder nations, while failing to address 
the special needs of borrower countries (Woods 2006). For instance, by making aid 
conditional on the implementation of neoliberal policies, the IMF and the World 
Bank undermine fragile countries’ ability to build robust domestic schemes of 
labour and social protection. 
 The existing international order contributes to disempowerment also 
indirectly, by creating perverse incentives at the domestic level. For instance, as 
Thomas Pogge and others have argued, internationally accepted rules such as the 
                                                
6 Cf. the notion of republican freedom as defined in Pettit (1997).  
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International Borrowing Privilege and the International Resource Privilege, make 
the prospect of seizing power in resource-rich countries particularly attractive, by 
giving any de facto leader the authority to borrow and dispose of resources on the 
country’s behalf (Pogge 2008, 118–121; 159–173; Pogge 2002). Other examples of 
indirect political injustice include harmful labour and tax competition which, some 
argue, heavily constrain states’ ability to implement fiscal and labour protections 
(see, e.g., Dietsch 2011; Avi-Yonah 2008; C. Barry and Reddy 2008). This results in 
disempowerment not only for states, but also for many of their citizens, who are 
exposed to high levels of social vulnerability due to the absence of appropriate 
social policies. The institutions that apply to them are not under their control. 
 Given the nature and causes of political injustice, addressing it requires that 
the rules governing the global order, and the power-structures underlying it, be 
reconfigured so as to allow each society to be genuinely self-determining, both 
internally (i.e., under the control of its citizens rather than of ruthless dictators) and 
internationally (i.e., not subject to the will of the most powerful nations). 
Institutional reform is of course complex to achieve but, when it comes to realizing 
political justice, it is also unavoidable. 
 
4. Microfinance, Humanity, and Distributive Justice 
In the previous section, we have looked at three perspectives from which to evaluate 
the moral failures of the contemporary international order. In this section, we 
consider whether supporting MFIs is a good way of satisfying the demands of 




4.1 Microfinance and Humanity 
Duties of humanity demand that we help the needy by donating some of our own 
resources, so long as this is not excessively costly to us. The language of donation 
resonates quite well with the practice of microfinance. As we have seen, MFIs often 
rely on subsidies to cover their start-up costs and ensure the continued provision of 
credit to the poor at low enough interest rates. Those who subsidize MFIs are 
typically labelled “donors.” Implicit in this label is the idea that these agents are 
acting on duties of humanity, using their own possessions to help the needy and 
destitute. But is microfinance a good way of discharging our humanitarian 
obligations? Probably not. 
 To understand why, let us consider duties of humanity more closely. These 
may be discharged in a variety of ways, including donations to charities, 
involvement in development projects, distance adoption and so forth. Although the 
bearers of duties of humanity have some latitude in deciding how to discharge them, 
the urgency of recipients’ needs appears to be a key consideration in well-conducted 
deliberations (cf. B. Barry 1991). To see this, consider an agent, X, faced with two 
needy strangers: Y, who is about to starve, and Z, whose standard of living is rather 
low but whose life is not at risk. As it happens, X can only assist one of them at 
reasonable cost to himself. That is, he can either save Y’s life, or improve Z’s 
standard of living. Although X is at liberty to choose whom to help, in these 
circumstances, choosing to help Z rather than Y seems morally sub-optimal. 
Appropriate reflection on the aim of duties of humanity should lead X to direct his 
assistance towards Y, whose needs are most urgent.  
 At this point, it is crucial to distinguish humanity from supererogatory 
generosity (see Buchanan 1987). The latter also involves helping others, but goes 
	 12	
above and beyond what is required by duty. Donations to museums and art galleries, 
for instance, arguably fall within the realm of supererogation. Such donations help 
others by making valuable cultural experiences more easily accessible to them, but 
the interests they advance do not seem weighty enough to give rise to moral 
requirements. Duties of humanity, by contrast, are distinctive in that they target 
those who are most in need of help, and whose fundamental interests are at stake. 
They “kick in” in circumstances where some fellow humans are so badly off that 
we—the relatively well off—cannot say to have fulfilled all our moral obligations 
even if they do not have any justice-based entitlements against us. 
These reflections allow us to understand why supporting MFIs is probably 
not a good way of discharging our humanitarian duties—namely, because MFIs do 
not target the very poor, whose needs are most urgent (Barres and Lard 2007, 56–
57). The very poor, whose most basic needs are unmet, rarely think about the 
possibility of taking out a loan, let alone of establishing a small business. Setting up 
an economic activity is a meaningful long-term project, which we normally consider 
only when our immediate, short-term needs are met. Moreover, the extremely poor 
lack the resources to comply with the early repayment schedules that, as we have 
seen, MFIs often adopt in order to avoid charging high interest rates and asking for 
collateral. Finally, although MFIs might help the very poor indirectly, for instance, 
by funding businesses that could then offer them jobs, or through trickle-down 
effects of increased societal wealth, it is not clear why—from the perspective of 
humanity—we should take the risk rather than help the very poor directly (Zeller 
and Johannsen 2008, 228). Why gamble with the lives of the needy, if there are 
alternative forms of aid that can effectively and more reliably address their 
predicament?  
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 If this is correct, supporting MFIs may not be the best way to fulfil our duties 
of humanity. To fulfil them, we have more reason to channel our resources towards 
forms of aid that tackle the very poor directly. 
 
4.2 Microfinance and Distributive Justice 
Let us now examine whether supporting MFIs fits well with the demands of global 
distributive justice—whether sufficientarian or egalitarian.7 Before addressing this 
issue, however, one point must be made clear: Whether or not MFIs are conducive 
to global sufficiency or global equality, supporting them will necessarily be a 
second-best solution. Why? Because, if we believe that the distribution of resources 
across the world is unjust, then we must also believe that it ought be structurally 
altered, by way of unconditional transfers of property or even through the 
establishment of just global institutions.8 Justice is done by changing patterns of 
holdings, not through aid and donations. Still, if large-scale structural changes are 
unlikely to occur in current political circumstances, a good way of fulfilling at least 
part of our duties of justice could involve compensating the victims of unjust 
structures through “donations’” to development projects.9  
Having said that, our specific question still stands: Are MFIs, among all aid 
programmes we may support on grounds of justice under non-ideal circumstances, a 
good choice? While it is true that aid in general fails to question the very legitimacy 
                                                
7 For the sake of completeness, we should mention that, according a third prominent paradigm of 
distributive justice, namely prioritarianism, what matters is whether a distributive scheme gives 
priority to the worst off. MFIs would be obviously problematic from a prioritarian perspective, 
because they fail to target the worst off. For an account and defence of prioritarianism, see Parfit 
(1997) and Arneson (2000).  
8 For a more in depth reflection on the non-ideal and second-best nature of microfinance as a remedy 
to global distributive injustice, see Daniel Butt’s chapter in this volume.  
9 The idea that economic contributions to development projects can be construed as a form of 
compensation for global injustice was first suggested by Thomas Pogge, according to whom citizens 
of affluent countries are implicated in the human-rights violations perpetrated by the global order and 
powerful states. See, for instance, Pogge (2005). 
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of the current global pattern of holdings, MFIs are particularly problematic in this 
respect, because they operate on the presupposition that citizens of affluent countries  
(i.e., the most likely potential lenders) are entitled to what they currently own. 
Otherwise, how could poor recipients of loans be asked to pay back what they 
receive, and with interests?  
This objection does not necessarily entail that microfinance is wholly 
unjustified in the highly non-ideal circumstances of our world. It may be empirically 
true that (i) the best way of getting out of poverty is to secure a sustainable way to 
make a living, rather than becoming structurally dependent on aid, and (ii) taking up 
responsibility to pay back a loan might be a good strategy for avoiding the traps and 
vicious circles that poverty causes. Yet, as Daniel Butt has eloquently argued in his 
contribution to this volume, those who think that the global pattern of holdings is 
unjust must recognize that microfinance has a somewhat paradoxical moral 
pedigree. On the one hand, it might constitute an effective means of escaping 
poverty traps. On the other hand, if the world’s poor are unjustly put in such traps to 
begin with, and lenders are partly responsible for this injustice, how can we 
consistently hold that the poor have an obligation to repay their debt? 
 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, MFIs may not be ideal instruments 
of distributive justice and, for the very same reason, they disappoint as vehicles of 
humanitarian action: They do not target the very poor. As Jonathan Wolff and Avner 
de Shalit point out, both egalitarians and sufficientarians converge on considering 
the very worst off as the highest priority on the distributive agenda, as they are both 
those who most clearly do not reach sufficiency levels and those who most strongly 
suffer due to the unequal structure of global holdings (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, 
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155–166).10 If we want to reduce inequalities or bring people up to sufficiency, we 
have to start by targeting the very poor and, as we have seen, MFIs fail to do this.  
 True, not all interpretations of sufficientarianism or egalitarianism claim that 
targeting the very poor should be our first priority. Paula Casal, for instance, argues 
that sufficientarians may well be committed to targeting those who are just below 
but not significantly below the sufficiency level, because this allows us to bring 
more people up to sufficiency (Casal 2007). This interpretation of sufficientarianism 
fits MFIs, since they are likely, if successful, to bring poor but not desperately poor 
people up to decent standards of living. However, Casal highlights this point 
precisely to show the implausibility of sufficientarianism, when conceived of along 
these lines. Arguably, a theory that cares about people having enough cannot 
plausibly be more interested in lifting a higher number of people above the threshold 
(regardless of what happens to the very worst-off) than in getting as many destitute 
individuals as close as possible to the threshold, even if still below it.11 
 Similarly, according to a very prominent approach to measuring inequality, 
calculated through the Gini coefficient, inequality of X decreases through general 
dispersion of X across the population, and not necessarily by improving the fate of 
the worst-off.12 Assuming this mode of measurement, if a large number of poor 
people, but not the poorest, are brought up towards the middle income level, this 
reduces inequality more than helping a smaller number of extremely poor 
individuals. That said, the Gini coefficient, although very prominent, is not an 
                                                
10 We are here assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that the worst off cannot plausibly be held 
responsible for their predicament. 
11 Casal (2007, 298) argues that some sufficientarian positions might be committed to raising people 
above sufficiency at the cost of further worsening the conditions of individuals who would be below 
the threshold anyhow. 
12 According to the Gini coefficient, maximal inequality occurs when, in a given society, one person 
holds the entirety of the income; while perfect equality occurs when the income is equally distributed 
across the population. 
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uncontested way of measuring inequality.13 Moreover, even if we were to accept it 
as a good way of measuring inequality, it is unclear that this would necessarily have 
the normative implication that we should not target the very poor first; indeed, the 
intuitive grip of Wolff’s and De Shalit’s claim that egalitarians should care first and 
foremost about those who are at the very bottom seems hard to defeat.   
 In sum, then, MFIs do not seem to be ideal instruments for tackling global 
distributive injustice. Development aid does not deliver the restructuring of holdings 
that distributive justice requires, and MFIs less so than other aid programmes, 
because they are based on loans that have to be paid back. Moreover, MFIs fail to 
target the very worst off, and this seems, on balance, to be a problem for both 
sufficientarian and egalitarian accounts of distributive justice.  
 
5. Microfinance and Political Justice 
Recall that political justice focuses on the power structures characterizing both the 
domestic and the international arena. A politically just world is one in which 
individuals and/or political communities are not victims of domination that makes 
them unable to shape their lives and futures. As seen above, from the perspective of 
political justice, the power structures currently characterizing the international arena 
are unacceptable. What is more, the world’s privileged arguably contribute to their 
continued existence—by either actively supporting, or at least acquiescing with, the 
political measures and institutions that reinforce them (Pogge 2008, 18–26, 118–
122, 145–150). For the purpose of this chapter, we broadly accept these arguments, 
and ask: If the world is politically unjust, are MFIs a good way to address its 
injustice? 
                                                
13 For a discussion of different ways of measuring inequality, see Sen and Foster (1997, 24–46). 
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Let us look more closely at our co-responsibility for the politically unjust 
features of the current global order. As we argued in Section 3.3, global political 
injustice gives rise to the disempowerment of both fragile countries and individuals. 
Some forms of global political injustice cause disempowerment directly, such as 
when powerful countries dominate weaker ones by imposing unfair conditions of 
cooperation (for instance on trade) or by shaping international institutions in ways 
that mirror their own interests rather than official development agendas. Other forms 
of political injustice, by contrast, cause disempowerment indirectly, by creating 
perverse incentives at the domestic level and contributing to making societies 
internally unjust, unstable, less responsive to citizens, and more prone to civil strife. 
 As in the case of distributive justice, ending political injustice requires us to 
change structural features of the global order. In this case, however, they are 
structures of global social power rather than patterns of holdings. The analogy 
continues: when we fail to support just reforms or to fight injustice, or when creating 
new institutions seems an unlikely prospect, we should at least indirectly 
compensate the victims of our involvement in an unjust global political and 
economic system, for instance by donating to well-run development agencies and 
NGOs. In the case of political, rather than distributive, justice, this means that we 
should donate more and donate particularly to development projects that aim at 
empowerment. We suggest that, if this is our aim, we have reasons to support 
microfinance projects, because they target disempowerment specifically. 
This may look like an ill-judged suggestion. After all, political justice is a 
public issue par excellence, to be addressed by establishing better institutional 
structures and making power accountable—not by supporting development projects. 
We are sensitive to this worry. However, when public means to end or reduce global 
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political injustice seem out of reach, a second-best option might be to support 
development projects that aim at making the powerless better equipped to both fight 
injustice, and shape their institutional environment, thus reducing domination. MFIs, 
in particular, might be a good empowerment tool to the extent that they succeed in 
achieving the following two goals:  
A. Reducing the short-term disempowerment of their specific 
addressees;  
B. Reducing the long-term disempowerment of society more broadly. 
 
A. 
The beneficiaries of MFIs are given the opportunity to free themselves from poverty 
and aid-dependence, thereby acquiring control over their lives and projects.14 
Moreover, the structure of lending of well-designed MFIs makes its beneficiaries 
less vulnerable qua economic actors, because their source of funding is normally not 
linked to high interest rates, which might lead them to incur further debts and fall 
into debt-traps, and less dependent on the local financing sector, which, in fragile 
countries, is typically precarious and corrupt.  
Having said that, in order to have these positive effects, MFIs must be 
structured in ways that significantly differ from many current microcredit projects in 
three respects: they must (i) rely on more resources, (ii) guarantee more continuity, 
and (iii) be more sensitive to local obstacles. First and foremost, more money has to 
be invested into MFIs, and this is precisely what this paper suggests should be done. 
Without adequate support from would-be donors, MFIs cannot realize their full 
potential as empowerment strategies. Second, microfinance projects must guarantee 
                                                
14 For evidence of the empowering effects of microfinance, especially on women, see Pitt, Khandker, 
and Cartwright (2006) and Sanyal (2009).  
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continuity where they operate, if they truly wish to reduce disempowerment and 
vulnerability in the long term. Third, microcredit activities have to be monitored 
more carefully, be evaluated in the wider social context in which they are to be 
implemented, and be made impervious to perverse incentives. Microloans, for 
instance, can potentially make poor economic actors less dependent on local 
organized crime and moneylenders. However, for this goal to be achieved, crime 
infiltrations have to be specifically targeted. Otherwise microcredit funds run the 
risk of being used to pay protection money, local moneylenders, and even to 
generate new illegal moneylending practices to help people repay their microloans 
(see, e.g., Mallick 2012; Gokhale 2009). Insufficient funds, lack of continuity, and 
lack of sensitivity towards local obstacles are common structural flaws of several 
current microfinance projects—but not, we suggest, intrinsic flaws of the 
microfinance agenda as such.15  
 
B. 
If sufficiently robust, MFIs can reduce the long-term disempowerment of the 
societies of which their addressees are members. Microfinance networks can be 
effective not only as instruments to fight poverty (although, as we have seen, not 
extreme poverty directly), but also as means to promote small business. This means 
that, in the long run, MFIs can support the rise of an economically active social class 
that has both a vested interest in having more stable, more accountable, and less 
corrupt political institutions, and some power to advance political demands.  
                                                
15 This also would hold for such incidents as Norway’s investigation into allegations that Yunus’ 
Grameen Bank diverted aid money from the Norwegian International Development Ministry, as well 
as from Sweden and Germany, to another Grameen entity not involved in microlending. See 
Anbarasan (2010). 
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This becomes particularly evident if one pays attention not only to 
microcredit but also to schemes of microsavings and microinsurance. Savings and 
insurance schemes are risk-management tools whose aim is to allow beneficiaries to 
make plans, take risks, and become active players in civil society. Reliance on 
savings and insurance schemes is typical of the middle class which, unlike the 
economic élites, cannot rely on independent wealth, but which can plan and take 
risks in a way that the very poor cannot. If implemented effectively, and bearing in 
mind the three caveats of sufficient resource availability, continuity, and context-
sensitivity outlined above (we are not, it is worth repeating, supporting existing 
MFIs), microcredit, microsavings and microinsurance might jointly contribute to the 
rise of an economically active, and therefore politically demanding, class in poor 
countries.  
 This, we suggest, would be a good remedial way of discharging our duty to 
reduce political injustice, by encouraging bottom-up empowerment. Why so? 
Because a “middle class,” conceived along the lines suggested above, is widely 
considered a key factor in the creation not only of economic prosperity, but also of 
institutional stability and political accountability (see, e.g., Glassman 1995; Barro 
1999). The middle class has an interest in political accountability and in stable rules 
to guarantee smooth business; moreover, unlike the very poor, it has some social 
power to further its interests. Members of the middle class place more demands on, 
and expect more from, their politicians. This is why the middle class is often 
considered a leading force in democratization processes (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006).16 Therefore, if we recognize a responsibility to end global political injustice, 
                                                
16 Admittedly, however, some authors suggest that the connection between the middle class and 
democratization is not universal. See, for instance, Jones (1998). 
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and believe that our ability to change global political structures directly is 
significantly limited, supporting (suitably reformed and restructured) MFIs might be 
a good second-best solution. 
 One important caveat is essential at this point. At first sight, one might get 
the impression that our claim concerning the potential positive impact of 
microfinance on political justice, via the rise of an economically active middle class, 
presupposes the empirical assumptions of classic modernization theory (Lipset 
1959). According to theories of modernization, democracy and institutional reforms, 
although absent at the early stages of economic development of a given society, will 
come naturally once growth and prosperity have reached a certain level. Once a 
prosperous middle class is in place, democracy will soon or later follow. This seems 
to suggest that even those who care about democracy need not worry if countries 
pursue development through authoritarian and oppressive means to begin with.  
Daron Acemoglu and Jim Robinson (2012), however, have recently 
advanced a powerful challenge to the empirical findings of modernization theory. 
They offer detailed empirical evidence to support the claim that both prosperity and 
democracy are the outcome of getting one’s institutions right. Their analysis 
suggests that development requires “inclusive,” rather than “extractive” institutions, 
where both kinds of institutions have a political as well as an economic dimension. 
Inclusive institutions empower people across society—political ones by 
guaranteeing the rule of law and by striking the right balance between centralization 
and devolution; economic ones by ensuring widespread participation in economic 
opportunities (through securing property rights, widespread access to the market, the 
prevention of monopolies, etc.). By contrast, extractive institutions—often the 
complex legacy of colonialism—systematically privilege (although in a range of 
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different ways) specific groups or elites. When societies manage to move from more 
extractive to more inclusive institutions, in economic as well as in political terms, 
both prosperity and full-blown democratization often follow. The failure of a lot of 
development work, in Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s view, is due to development 
institutions overlooking this important point and focusing on growth instead—as 
well as to the brute fact that it is extremely difficult for a society that has deeply 
entrenched extractive institutions, as a lot of former colonies do, to get rid of them 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
Our argument concerning the potential of microfinance is perfectly 
compatible with this institutionalist perspective. The various instruments of 
microfinance, when restructured along the lines we have suggested, can be seen as 
an attempt to move to a more “inclusive” set of economic rules, which give access to 
economic opportunities to a wider segment of society. Microfinance, in a way, can 
be seen as itself a form of inclusive economic institution. What is more, if 
Acemoglu and Robinson are right in arguing that economically and politically 
inclusive institutions are mutually reinforcing, and if we want politically inclusive 
institutions (as political justice requires), fostering the development of a social group 
capable of demanding them is a good way of working towards that goal. 
Finally, to link up this point to the conclusion we reached at the end of the 
previous section, it should be noted that promoting political justice might also have 
a positive effect on distributive injustice. As Amartya Sen (1983; 1999; 2000) has 
argued, politically accountable structures of power are much less likely to tolerate 
extreme domestic deprivation than other regimes, and are often more capable of 
addressing it. Therefore, although our claim is that the best prospects for MFIs as 
“development tools” concern the fostering of political justice, one must, as we noted 
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at the beginning of this chapter, always be attentive to the mutually reinforcing 
relationship between poverty and disempowerment—and conversely, between 
political and distributive justice. 
 
6. Objections 
Having suggested that microfinance offers a possible second-best response to the 
problem of global political injustice, we now consider three worries that might be 
raised in relation to our argument, namely, that MFIs create perverse incentives; that 
MFIs will fail to promote the rise of a middle class in developing countries; and that 
MFIs cannot be both self-sufficient (i.e., not dependent on subsidies) and non-
exploitative. 
 
6.1 Perverse incentives 
A first concern is that supporting MFIs might generate the type of perverse 
incentives often associated with development aid. Paradoxically, aid programmes 
that succeed in alleviating poverty may (i) breed passivity on the part of the 
disadvantaged, making them less prone to acknowledging and criticizing their 
governments’ deficiencies and, relatedly, (ii) breed complacency on the part of 
governments themselves (Bräutigam 2000). 
 Examples of this phenomenon are offered by Emergency Social Funds, such 
as those established in Bolivia and Peru in the late eighties and early nineties. These 
were primarily aimed at mitigating the adverse impact of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes on the poorest segments of these countries’ populations. However, as 
Christine Whitehead (1995, 53) explains, the Funds were also “designed to reduce 
the potential political unrest ensuing from adjustment, and so to ensure acceptance 
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of [liberalizing] economic reform.”   
Like development aid, MFIs aim at alleviating poverty and often rely on 
donor subsidies. In light of this, one could reasonably worry that, if MFIs were 
successful in their mission, they too could have the effect of “buffer[ing] societies 
from some of the costs of bad governance and reduce their incentive to press for 
change and greater accountability” (Bräutigam 2000, 26).17  
If our argument is correct, however, this concern should be significantly 
weaker in the case of MFIs. Although many of them rely on donor subsidies and 
strive to ameliorate the conditions of the poor, their modus operandi arguably 
insulates them from these types of perverse incentives. Instead of “handing out 
assistance” from the top down, MFIs are designed to give their low-income 
customers the opportunity to help themselves. Far from breeding passivity, access to 
financial services can incentivize entrepreneurship, make the poor better able to 
cope with fluctuating economic conditions, and in so doing allow them to take more 
responsibility for how their lives go.  
Moreover, by potentially decreasing the economic vulnerability of the poor 
and increasing their independence, MFIs place them in a better position to press for 
institutional change and hold their governments to account. While the starving might 
neither be able to, nor particularly interested in, political participation, members of 
an emerging middle class have both the resources and motivation to insist that 
governments attend to their interests.  
Of course, this conclusion only holds on the basis of our optimistic 
hypothesis that support for MFIs can generate a virtuous circle, and facilitate the 
development and strengthening of a middle class in developing countries. But what 
                                                
17 In the original, the quoted passage refers to aid in general, rather than microfinance specifically. 
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if this optimism is misplaced? 
 
6.2 Effectiveness 
Our argument rests on the normative assumption that we are partly responsible for 
global political injustice, and that supporting MFIs can be a good second-best way 
of honouring our responsibilities when our capacity to contribute to structural 
changes is limited. The argument, however, depends on two mutually connected 
empirical assumptions that we cannot fully defend here (we are, after all, making a 
normative argument): First, that MFIs, suitably reformed, might help promote the 
rise of the middle class in fragile countries; second, that a sizeable middle class is a 
crucial factor for institutional stability, the rule of law, political accountability, and 
democracy. Are these two assumptions sufficiently robust? 
 We shall not discuss the second connection, as we find the link between 
widespread economic participation across different groups in society and 
accountability/democratization sufficiently established in the literature. It is not, of 
course, entirely uncontroversial, but any argument proposing a specific recipe for 
development will have to rest on a somewhat controversial empirical theory, and our 
argument is no exception. 
 The first link—between MFIs and the rise of the middle class—is shakier, 
and a few more words must be devoted to it. Whereas some evidence seems to 
suggest that MFIs can promote the short-term empowerment of their clients by 
helping them grow out of poverty- and debt-traps, it is by no means clear that MFIs 
so far have helped the rise of a stable middle class. On the contrary, microcredit is 
often under attack in public debates for being used to supplement household income 
rather than to develop new economic activities, and even when new businesses open 
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thanks to microloans, they are rarely ambitious enough to, for instance, allow for the 
employment of people other than the loan-taker (Surowiecki 2008).  
 We agree that evidence so far encourages caution, and our aim is not to 
portray MFIs as the absolute best or most reliable means of promoting the rise of a 
middle class in fragile countries. However, we also do not think that MFIs’ likely 
contribution to such an aim should be assessed only based on evidence from existing 
projects. As we have argued in the previous section, microfinance can only stand a 
chance to fulfil its empowerment aims if it is reformed in three respects. 
Firstly, microfinance currently constitutes a relatively minor part of the 
development aid sector, whereas our argument suggests that, in virtue of being co-
responsible for global political injustice, we ought to donate more in general, and 
devote a more substantial proportion of our donations to microfinance projects. 
Secondly, several current microfinance projects, especially those that rely on small 
NGOs and on the private sector, are volatile. Obviously, in order to achieve the 
desired aim of furthering the rise of a middle class, microfinance projects ought to 
guarantee some continuity, at least until the first evidence of a self-sustaining 
dynamic being triggered is in sight. Furthermore, more ambitious loans have to be 
made available, so as to finance small business projects that are more likely to create 
jobs.18 These desiderata, in turn, would be much easier to achieve with an increase 
in donor funds. Thirdly, and relatedly, a richer and more reliable microfinance sector 
is better equipped to address and monitor local and context-sensitive obstacles, such 
as crime infiltrations.  
                                                
18 For an argument along similar lines, see Surowiecki (2008). Whether this would move away from 
the logic of microfinance narrowly conceived and into one of “social lending” is irrelevant to our 
argument. 
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More generally, MFIs can be suitably restructured so as to make them more 
targeted at furthering a local, productive and autonomous middle class in the 
medium and long run, for instance by investing in microsaving and microinsurance 
schemes as well as in microloans, and by assessing microloan applications in a more 
businesslike way—that is, looking at the intrinsic quality and promise of the 
proposal and not only at its poverty-relief potential. 
 In sum, we should be cautious in using evidence from current microfinance 
projects as a knock-down argument against the capacity of MFIs in principle to 
further a local middle class. Of course, this does not mean that the reform and 
development agenda we are envisaging here can be guaranteed to be successful. 
This, however, is a feature that MFIs share with all empowerment projects, which 
are necessarily more complex, long-term based, and riskier, than projects aiming at 
relieving immediate needs. 
 
6.3 Lack of Self-sustainability  
Finally, one might worry that microfinance cannot successfully combine economic 
self-sustainability with the aim of helping the poor: The two desiderata conflict with 
each other (Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters 2011). Consider the following example. 
Banco Compartamos (Mexico) is not only self-sustaining, but economically very 
successful. It started issuing shares in April 2007, in what proved to be an extremely 
popular public sale. The commercial success of Banco Compartamos, however, has 
been in large part fuelled by high interest rates. At the time the public sale took 
place, for instance, the total yearly interest on loans had reached 94 percent—
something Yunus himself regarded as morally unacceptable (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Morduch 2009). The worry, however, is that given the high transaction costs 
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involved in micro-credit, financial self-sustainability can only be obtained the 
“Compartamos way,” namely at the high moral price of making money out of the 
needy.  
 If we take this trade-off to be a real one—thus granting our objector’s 
premise—two possible responses seem available. One gives prominence to the 
commercial rationale behind microfinance, the other to its “moral” one. The former 
response-strategy has been defended, for instance, by The Economist. “Despite 
charging what may seem high interest rates,” says The Economist, “MFIs typically 
have wafer-thin margins because of the high costs of making and collecting 
payments on millions of tiny loans. Pressing them to reduce rates further would 
jeopardise their ability to attract private capital, inhibiting their growth. Slower 
growth would in turn hamper their ability to harness economies of scale in order to 
lower transaction costs and cut rates of their own accord, as many—including the 
biggest for-profit MFIs—have done in the past. Forcing down rates would also deter 
new entrants and reduce competition” (The Economist 2010, added emphasis). 
Although this response might make sense from a purely commercial 
standpoint, it is not one we endorse. In fact, from the perspective advanced in this 
chapter, we should not be deeply concerned with the trade-off between self-
sustainability and poverty alleviation in the first place. In our view, the very idea 
that MFIs constitute the “silver bullet that will cure world poverty and spread the 
wealth-creating force of capitalism across the globe” (Perkins, 2008) is misguided. 
We have argued that supporting MFIs is a way for those who contribute to, and 
benefit from, an overall unjust global order to compensate the disadvantaged. Given 
that, on the most plausible principles of global distributive justice, some of what the 
wealthy currently possess is not something they are entitled to, the fact that MFIs 
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might not be self-sustaining after all, or may not generate profit, is of no relevance 
to our moral assessment of them. Of course, it would be highly desirable if they 
could become self-sustaining, profitable, and serve the interests of the poor. But our 
support for MFIs should not be conditional on their ability to meet all of these 
desiderata. 
To the extent that MFIs are a good second-best mechanism for addressing 
pressing problems of political injustice, and to the extent that we have stringent 
duties to address these problems, we ought to support them. Even if it were true that 
“non-exploitative” MFIs could not continue to exist without donations, this would 
not be an argument against MFIs themselves, but rather, it would be an argument in 
favour of continued donations. As Jonathan Morduch asks “[I]f money spent to 
support microfinance helps to meet social objectives in ways not possible through 
alternative programs like workfare or direct food aid, why not continue subsidizing 
microfinance?” (Morduch 1999, 1571). If the antecedent of this conditional is true—
as we have cautiously suggested—then we see no reason why not. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have argued that while supporting MFIs is not an ideal way of 
discharging our duties of humanity and distributive justice, it can be a good second-
best strategy for addressing global political injustice, by contributing to the rise of 
the middle class in fragile countries, and political empowerment as a result. To 
achieve this goal, MFIs have to be significantly reformed, so as to benefit from 
greater resource-availability, more continuity, and context-sensitivity. That said, let 
us conclude with a modicum of caution, by highlighting the modest reach of our 
argument. Our aim has been to answer this question: If you are persuaded that global 
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political injustice is one of the most pressing problems of the global order, and you 
have no reasonable means of addressing it directly, what should you do? Our claim 
is that supporting suitably planned microfinance projects is likely to be a good 
option, bearing in mind all the usual qualifications, risks, and possible perverse 
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